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This paper shows thatup-frontpayments can play a crucial role in providing efficient
investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment
effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shaven [1980] when courts use an expectation damnge
remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front
payments with what we call "Cadillac" contracts (contracts for a veiy high quality or quantity).
This combination provides efficient investment incentives in complex contracting problems when
an expectation damage remedy is accompanied by a broad duty to mitigate damages. This
indicates that an expectation remedy is well-suited to multidimensional, but one-sided, investment
problems, in contrast to specific performance, which Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] showed is
well-suited to two-sided, but unidimensional, investment problems.
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1. Introduction
Up-front payments are common enough. One may wonder, though. why one party to
a contract sometimes pays the other before the other performs? This essay identifies a
new purpose for this practice: Up-front payments, combined with what we call "Cadillac"
contracts, can provide a simple solution to the incomplete contracting problem, a solution
that incorporates the traditional remedy of expectation damages with a broad duty to
mitigate damages. This solution is remarkably robust, working nor only in the simple
contractual settings of Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980], but in settings where the
investment decisions are complex, though made by only one party.
Up-front payments are often associated with special orders, custom goods, or other
contracts involving specific investments. This is probably no accident. Whenever in-
vestments are relationship—specific, the investor risks a 'holdup"—i.e.. he risks losing
the returns to his investments in negotiations after the investments are s'ink Adequate
protection must somehow be provided, and Williamson [1983] has argued that if courts
are an impractical option, then up-front payments serve to protect investment returns
against the holdup problem."2
We ask here whether such payments are useful in the polar case when courts ate
effective. The initial response of those familiar with law and economics might be "no"—
at least for the extreme case where courts can costlessly enforce contracts. After all,
Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980]showedthat enforceable fixed-price contracts not
only protect investment returns, but can overprotect them and cause overinvestrnent.
twilhian..son [19831 calls such up-front payments "hostages," and develops a model of "private order-
nc in which a hostage is paid to the investor—seller up front. This payment serves to bind the buyer,
substituting for an enforceable contract.
2High legal fees can make court an impractical option; alternatively, courts can be ineffective if one
party is unreliable and may flee from the court's jurisdiction, or become judgment-proof from insolvency.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 2
If such contracts by themselves can overprotect investment, then why add an up-front
payment?
This paper argues that up-front payments can play a richer role. They are important
even in models where courts are costless and there is no fear of a judgment-proof defen-
dant. They control which party chooses to breach the contract, thereby eliminating the
Rogerson—Shavell overinvestment problem and providing efficient breach and investment
incentives under a breach remedy of expectation daniages.3
Consider, for instance, the not-so-fictional story of an economics department near
Chicago. The department's building is undergoing substantial remodeling, remodeling
that will definitely be completed in a year, perhaps even earlier. In the meantime, the
department rents space in a commercial district on a 1-year lease. Although the landlord
sets the rent high, he provides an up-front payment as an inducement to tent the space:
the first two months are free. Given the high rent, the landlord has no desire to terminate
the tenancy (after the first two months) since no one is offering higher rent. However,
the department may desire to breach the contract and move out of the officespace,if the
remodeling nears completion before the lease terminates. In fact. the department will
move out at the very time moving is efficient, assuming that it must pay the landlord
damages calculated to compensate him for the breach (expectation damages). Moreover,
the department will make efficient (multifaceted) ex-ante investment decisions. For in-
stance, it will invest optimally in hastening the remodeling, and will also "settle into"
thedowntownbuilding to just the right extent (making appropriate expenditures to dec-
orate, move books, and buy new business cards and stationery; expenditures that take
3Thereader familiarwithShaveN (1980, p. 412j may be skeptical of this claim since hisfourth
conclusionis that "There does not exist a damage measure which leads to Pareto efficient decisions
concerning both breach and reliance 'independent of the type of contractual situation Moreover, Shavell
(1980, p 41TJ does not neglect the possibility of up-front payments, and indeed assumes, "without loss
of generality that the contract price k ii paid when the contract is made." However. Shavell is only
considering up-front payments made by the investor to the non-investor instead of the other way around.
His conclusion arises from this restriction.Cadillac Contracts and tip-Front Payments:by A.S. Edlin Page 3
intoaccount the likely lengths of stay).
The combinationof the expectation damage remedy, the up-front payment, and the
highrent iscritical totheefficiency of this contract. Theup-frontpayment induces the
departmentto accept the high rent.The high rent, inturn, ensures that the alternative-
rental value of the office space stays below the rent. Otherwise, the department might
not unilaterally move even though moving were efficient: since the department has the
right to stay under the lea.se, the landlord would then have to bribe the department to
move. The more settled" it is, the larger the bribe would generally be: this means the
department would have a (bribe—seeking) incentive to "overrelf on the tease; i.e., to
overinvestin the specific investment of settlingin. The overinvestment problem would
turn out to worsenifthe landlord could unilaterally breach, terminating the tenancy and
paying the tenant expectation damages.
Such an overinvestment (overreliance) problem from expectation damages has become
a textbook result in law and economics. Polinsky [1989, 31, br example. writes:
Thee.rjctation remedy generally leads to too much reliana btcause it
git'es the relying party thevaluethat would have been created by (he reliance
incest rnent if the contract had been performed.
Recent workindicates that the overinvestment problem is not so general as was
thoughtwhenPolinskywrote thispassage.Rogerson (1984]and Shavell(1980] stud-
ied indivisible trade—trade either happened or it didn't. In contrast,whenthe quantity
the parties contract to trade is a continuous variable as in the lease example, Edlin and
Reichelstein [1993] have now shown that simple fixed—price contracts can induce an ef-
ficient level of investment for one party under an expectation damage remedy. (Under
specificperformance, seealso Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994] and Chung 119911.)
However,inthe Rogerson—Shavell discrete—trade context, the balancing approach of EdlinCadillac Contracts and Up-FrontPayments: by A.S. Edlin Page 4
andReichelstein[19931 requires random contracts.4 Moreover, these approaches do not
create appropriate incentives when the investment problem is multifaceted, as when the
economics department above needs to decide its expenditures to speed the remodeling
and also to settle into the downtown offices.
This paper begins by returning to the Rogerson—Shavell context and showing that
up-front payments to the investor provide efficient investment incentives tinder an ex-
pectation damage remedy without random contracts. This result furthers the argument
that standard legal remedies do not necessarily cause overinvestment: the conventional
wisdom embodied in the Polinsky quotation stems from the particular contracts Roger-
son and Shavell considered. Our efficiency results remove the impetus to restrict the
expectation damage remedy, as proposed by Cooter and Eisenberg 11985. p. l467]; in
fact, unrestricted expectation damages is a better "problem—solvin& default rule than
specific performance when only one party invests. (See Schwartz 1993] for a helpful
taxonomy of default rules.)
The intuition behind combining up-front payments and expectation darnage is situ-
pie.The party that makes a sufficiently large up-front payment will not want to breach.
since finishing performance requires only a commensurately small subsequent payment.6
Therefore, the other party will commit any breach. Controlling who breaches is critical
under an expectation remedy, because the breacher gets the residual left after paying
the victim compensatory damages. If the breacher is also the investor he will invest
4ilermalin and Katz 119931 developa non-random solutionfor the discrete context; their fill-in-the-
price contract is elegant, but is-somewhat more complex than a fixed-price contract and requires that
renegotiation be ruled out in the 'syinznetric information" cases considered here. (For general abstract
mechanisms see Rogerson (19921; for the use of liquidated damages see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993]
or Spier and Whinston [1994J.)
Cooter and Eisenberg (19851 argue that overreliance will not occur if expectation damages protect
only the expectancy conditional upon efficient (or reasonable) investment. Spin and Whinston (19941
make the same argument.
lznplicit in this comment is the assumption that the breaching party cannot sue. This assumption
iscentraland the paper will provide examples where it holds and where it doent. Where it doesn't,
policy conclusions tollow.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments:by A.S. Edlin Page 5
efficiently,maximizingthis residual.
InRogerson [1984] and Shavell's (1980]models,breach is committed by the party with
the uncertain valuation of trade. If the breacher is not the investor, overinvestment results
for the reason Polinsky described.7 In contrast, when the investor breaches, he invests
efficiently, just as in the "second case" in Shavell [1980, 484—Si], where the investor has
the uncertain valuation and so is the party to breach. Section 2 simply observes that up-
front payments allow the parties to control who breaches, so that the overinvestment effect
from expectation damages is not mandated by the potentially exogenous arrangement of
who must invest and who experiences uncertainty. The parties control their fate, and
can avoid overinvestment by choosing an appropriate contract.8
Section 3 explains that the court does not have to observe damages for the approach
in Section 2 to provide efficient investment incentives; the court need only make an un-
biased damage judgment. Section 4 shows that this approach works in quite general
settings where both parties' valuations are uncertain, and where one party makes mul-
tidimensional choices about investment and trade. Allocating all "decision rights" both
cc ante and ex post to one party is important, and to do this, we argue that the law (or
perhaps the parties) should incorporate a broad duty to mitigate damages. a duty that
includes accepting non-conforming performance. When the investor cannot be given a
decision right over production, a good substitute is for the contract to be "divisible,"
which allows the investor to breach one part of the contract without discharging the
other party's duty to perform other parts of the contract. It is also important to the
approach we outline to avoid situations with holdups where both parties must come to
an agreement in order to trade aciently. The parties may do so by signing a "Cadil-
'SeeShavell's 11980, pp. 473-83j firstcase andalso Itogerson119841.
'Contrastthis viewpoint withShavell(1980, 4731, who did not consider up-front payments being made
to the investor, and who therefore describedthesituation in his"fiat case" as follows: 'tioticeherethat
the party who chooses reliance does not face uncertainty in a direct way and that the other party does.
Thismeans that the party who decidesaboutreliance isnot the one who decides aboutbreach."Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 6
lac" contract—a contract to trade as high a quantity and quality as they are likely to
want. Such a contract ensures that all adjustments of trade are "downward," andcan
be achieved with unilateral breach. Hence, Cadillac contracts and either divisibility or
a broad duty to mitigate damages combine to extend the results in Section 2 to quite
general contexts.
It should not he too surprising thatefficient contractsexist, even in the genera!
contexts of in Section 4. After all, the first-best shouldbeattainableifone party is
risk-neutral and can feasibly make all decisions. Compare the situation to a standard
principal—agent framework where the solution would be to have the agent buy the firm.
The solution presented here is interesting for at least three reasons. First it is liistori-
cal: it shows that earlier overinvestment results stemmed from restrictions on the foriti
of contract. Second, it illustrates how fixed-price contracts can interact with legal doc-
trines such as expectation damages, a broad duty to mitigate damages, and contractual
divisibility, to effectively give all decision rights and the residual to one party. This
suggestsa variety of guiding principles for parties writing contracts or for courts con-
structing problem—solving default rules. Third, it incorporates up-front payments made
to the party that undertakes investment, a common phenomenon that differs from the
investor buying out the other party. (Our agent, instead of buying out the firm, is paid
a significant up-front sum in return for promising to deliver the maximum output.)
The paper has four remaining sections. Section 2 explains the importance of up-
front payments in the discretecontextof Rogerson and Shavell. Section 3 relaxes the
informational requirements of the court. Section 4 generalizes the contract solution to a
context where investment and deployment of assets are multidimensional decisions, and
where both parties place unknown value upon trade. Section 5 discusses implications.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 7
2. Discrete Trade Revisited
2.1.Themodel
This section lays out a model of discrete trade like those in Rogerson [1984] and Shavell
[1980). A risk-neutral buyer and seller contract to trade a good, and one party, in our
case the seller, must invest S E [o.3]beforethe other's trade valuation is known. If the
good is produced ex post, the seller must later incur the variable cost c(S).9 If the good
is not produced, the investment may be redeployed to earn an alternative use value, or
salvage value, a(S), where (0) =0.The traded good has a random value v(O) to the
buyer, where B denotes the realized contingency. We assume that both parties observe the
values iiandc ex post, after the investment and contingency are determined. Production
and trade are efficient ex post if and only if the value to the buyer is sufficiently high
that
v(9)—c(S) ￿5(S) . (1)
Otherwise it is better to sell the investment as salvage for a(s).
We assume some optimal investment level or levels exist. Since both buyer and seller
are risk-neutral, any first-best level of investment satisfies
8 e argmaxf ma4v(O) —c(S),(S)1dF—5, ç2)
where F (0) is the cumulative distribution for contingencies 8. The Liming of events is
summarized below.
91n Rogerson (1984] and Shavell [1980] thebuyer investsandthe seller hasuncertain costs. This
difference is unimportant here.However, whentrade is not discrete, as in Section 4, it becomes important.
Therewe explicitly present a solution method involving a broad duty to mitigate damages. On the other
hand, if the buyer invests, & parallel analysiswouldinvolve the contract being TMdivisible," a concept we
elaborate later.Cadillac Contractsand Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 8
Time Line
DateI Date 2 Date 3 Date 4
' Court or Settlement
Contract Investment 8 Breach or
Negotiated Chosen Realized Delivery
Figure 1:
2.2. Efficient investment from up-frént payments
We show below that when an up-front payment is possible, the parties can sign a fixed-
price contract that provides optimal investment incentives. The parties should sign such
a contract since it maximizes joint surplus, and this surplus can be divided arbitrarily
with the up-front payment.
We begin by defining up-front payments.
Definition 1. An up-front payment is anythingvaluable delivered atthetime a con-
tract is signed (other than the promise of payment for the goods). It might represent
money paid, another profitable trade, or the signing of a separate profitableagreement.
We consider a fixed-price contract to trade the good at a price p to be paid at the
time of trade. The buyer also pays the seller an amount T up front, which may be viewed
as compensation for the seller's investment. This up-front payment plays a critical role
in creating efficient investment incentives.
We assume that if either the seller or the buyer breaches the contract, the other
party may choose to sue to get an expectation damage remedy imposed. In contrast, the
breaching party cannot sue on a "breach of contract" theory since the other party hasCadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments:by A.S. Edlin Page 9
breachedno contractual duty. We also assume that the breaching party cannot sue in
what is called "quasi-contract," and that the court will find no other reason to assist the
breaching party.'° This latter assumption does not accurately reflect the legal system
in some jurisdictions and cases. For instance, the doctrine that a "willful" contract
breacher cannot sue is common but not universal." Where the assumption does not
presently apply, our analysis will generate a legal policy recommendation as well as a
contracting recommendation. The policy recommendation is that courts should become
increasingly skeptical of such suits in quasi-contract; but until they do, the contracting
prescription is that parties pay the up-front payment in a Separate contract with separate
consideration. These prescriptions eliminate a race to breach,'2 and allow the parties to
neatly overcome the overinvestment problem by controlling who breaches.
To be concrete about the sort of unjust enrichment suit that will prevent the parties
from solving their contracting problem, consider the lease example in the introduction,
Suppose that while the economics faculty is attending the Winter AEA meetings, the
landlord removes their belongings and re-rents their offices. They can site for breach
of contract to recover any damages they suffer, but they may suffer no damages: They
'°The poasibility of suing "in quantum meruit," one type of "quasi-contractual" suit, is a long-
established way to recover benefits conferred on another who the court deems would otherwise be
unjustly enriched. Even where there is a contract, and bne party has clearlybreachedthe contract,
courts have often allowed that party to recover the value of benefits he conferred upon the victim of the
breach. (See, e.g.1 Britlonv. Turner[1834],where the plaintiff breached a twelve-month labor contract
by working only nine and one-half months, but was allowed to recover nine and one-halt month's wages.)
However1 courts sometimes refuse to allow such recoveries. See BerL-c8'Co.v. Griffin, Inc. [1976,7641
where the court note that, generaIly quantum meruit recovery will not be awarded where the conduct
has been 'wilful' [sic]."
ttSee the comment later regarding Berke & Co.it.Griffin, Inc. (1976]. Some commentators argue
that even a willful breacher should be accorded relief. See Nordstrom and Woodland [1959, 211—14].
Ijf quantum meruit recovery is allowed for the breather, extreme perversities may result. Suppose
that unjust enrichment means receiving more than one's expectancy resulting from another's breach, and
suppose further that a contract breather can always sue to prevent unjust enrichment. Then both buyer
and seller will be in a race to breach when tiade is inefficient. Each will attempt to make announcements
of his refusal to perform in advance of the other's announcements. More peculiar still, each wilt assert
in court that the announcement of the other did not amount to an anticipatory repudiation or breach!
These Alice-in-Wonderland phenomena occur if the breacher can always "pin" the other party to his
expectancy by suing for disgorgement of any surplus from not trading when that is efficient.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments:by AS. Edlin Page 10
mayfind other accommodations for less rent and not be much inconvenienced. Would
the landlord, then, be able to sue them to recover the rent for the two free months they
enjoySat thebeginning of their lease, or for their rental savings from their involuntary
relocation?Were they "unjustly enriched"? In this paper, we assume the answer is no
The landlordwhobreached hasnocause of action.Thisassumption is probably realistic
inthis example, however, in other examples where the structure of the contract and
flavor of the breach differs, some jurisdictions will allow the breacher to sue. This paper
provides reasons not to. We will return to these issues later.
Since we follow Rogerson [1984) and Shavell [1980] in ignoring litigation costs, a breach
victim will sue whenever damages are positive. Although abstracting from litigation cost
necessarily limits the descriptive power of this paper, it allows us to further develop
the influential benchmark case they considered. For now, we assume that the court
has sufficient information to properly calculate damages. As Shavell [19S0J emphasizes.
this requires the court to observe the value v(9),butnot the state 0 nor the functional
relationship v (.). Section 3 of this paper considers imperfectly informed courts that can't
observe even u.
Damages will be calculated using the expectation formula; this formula compensates
for economic damages, and is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Expectation damages are the amount that makes the victim of a breach
exactly as well off as she would have been if the other party had performed.
Expectation damages give the victim what lawyers call her "expectancy." Accord-
ingly, if the seller breaches, he will have to pay the buyer
max[O,v(O)—pJ . (3)
If the buyer's damages v(O)—p are positive, thebuyer gets the same payoff as perfonnance.
She can bring an action to recover t'(O)— p, or equivalently, since they anticipate theCadillac Contracts and Up-FrontPayments: by A.S. Edlin Page 11
result, the partiesmay simply settle out ofcourt, If v(O)— p were negative, the buyer
wouldnot sue, so the seller pays 0. If the buyer breaches, she must likewise pay the seller
max(O,p —c(S) — a(S)] , (4)
assumingthat the buyer notifies the seller of the breach before he incurs the variable
costs c(S). Again the "max" takes into account the fact that no one forces the seller
to sue. The seller's expectancy is p —c(S), buti(S) is deducted because the seller is
obligated to "mitigate" his damages by selling the investment at its salvage value,'31'
Although the duty to mitigate damages can induce efficient actions ex post, this feature
is inconsequential in a symmetric information context where renegotiation is possible.
The duty to mitigate damages is nonetheless quite important for efficient investment
incentives, and Section 4 explains that in a more general setting, the duty to mitigate
damages should be broader than the law often recognizes.
When contractual quantity is not an available instrument, the key to inducing effi-
cient investment is to set the price low so that the seller—investor commits any breach.
(Compare with Edlin and Reichelstein (1993], where quantity is used as an instrument.)
Proposition 1. Let p Einfu(9).Then the seller invests and breaches efficiently, flow-
ever, unlesstrade isalways efficient, the seller mustbe paidan up-front payment, or he
will not agree to such a low price.
13[fthebuyer wants to breach, she should announce her intention early, repudiating the contract.
Otherwise her damage payment might increase by c(S) (if the seller produced) or even c(S) + a(S) (if
the seller produced and lost his opportunity to salvage his investment).
"The duty to mitigate generally bars a plaintiff from recovering costs incurred after cancellation of the
contract. A canonical example l found in Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. [1929),whereLuten
Bridge Co. continued building a bridge after notice of cancellation was given by Rockingham County.
Rockingharn successfully argued that it owed Luten only the "damages which the company would have
sustained, if it had abandoned construction at that time." Note, however, that some expenses incurred
after cancellation are recoverable. For Instance, advertising expenses are generally recoverable when they
might reasonably increase salvage value; in a typical view, such expenses are recoverable even "where
the result is an aggravation of the damages rather than a mitigation1" if "expenses are the result of a
prudent attempt to mininte damages." (Air. Eddie, inc. a. Ginsberg [1968),abreach of contract
case, where a wrongfully dismissed employee under a three-year employment contract spent $1,340 in
an unsuccessful job search.)Cadillac Contracts andUp-FrontPayments:by A.S. Edlin Page 12
Proof: Suppose thebuyerdoesnot breach, but stands ready,willing, andable tobuy.
Theneithertheseller performsand the buyerpays p and enjoys v(O)from consuming
thegood, or the seller breaches and must pay v(O) — p in damages. Either way,thebuyer
haspayoff v(O) —p, which is non-negative since pinfv(O). Performance is thereforea
weakly dominant strategy,since breach would yield the buyer at best 0, and even less if
theseller sued. (Recall that we assumed the buyer cannotbreD.chand sue.)
Ifthesellerbreaches,he will be sued. His payoffwill bethe salvage value minus
damages,i.e., i(S) —(t40)
—p].If the seller performs, he receives p —c(s), sohe breaches
if and only it"5
a(S) —v(8)￿ —c(S) - (5)
This inequality matches inequality (1), so the parties trade if and only if trade is efficient
cc post.Since expectationdamages is a liability rule allowing unilateral breach, no
renegotiation is necessary for efficient trade.
The seller's investment problem is to choose
S E arg maxf maxp —c(S),(S)
—v(9)+ pJdF —S. (6)
This optimization differs from the social optimization given by (2) only by adding p—v(O)
in each contingency. Investment incentives are unaltered, so we have shown that choosing
p =mtu(O) induces efficient investment and breach.
Nonetheless, the buyer must pay the seller an up-front payment to induce him to
sign such a contract unless .trade is always efficient. That is, consider a case where trade
is sometimes inefficient: Le., for some 0', v(O') —c(S)ca(5).Since by construction
p ￿ v(O'), substitution yields p— c(5) <(S). Without an up-front payment, the seller
would be better off avoiding the contract, investing 5 andselling it as scrap.'80
"Tin where v(9)= c(s) leave the sellerindifferent.
"If the optimalinvestmentSis notunique, read 5asthe seller'schoicefrom among the optima.Cadillac Contractsand Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 13
Thus, the seller invests efficiently if the buyer and seller agree to tradeatthe favorable
price given in Proposition I. However, the buyer must often pay the seller some up-front
payment T to convince him to sign the contract under these favorable terms. In fact, an
up-front payment is necessary in cases where Rogerson—Shavell overinvestment occurs,
i.e.. in cases where trade is sometimes inefficient. (Note that the up-front payment might
not be necessary if costs were uncertain as well.)
A similar efficiency result holds if the buyer invests before the sellefs costs are known.
Proposition 2. Suppose the buyer invests, and let the valuations be u(S) and c(9).
Then if p supc(O), the buyer invests and breaches efficiently.
Proof: The proof is left to the reader, since it is essentially the same as when the
seller jnvests.O
Our anumption that the contract breather cannot sue may at times appear punitive
to the breather. For instance, if the buyer invests and the seller fails to deliver, the buyer
keeps any up-front payment. Possibly, the buyer gets more than her expectancy out of
the deal. We previously pointed out that in cases such as our lease example, it is realistic
to think that the party who made the up-front payment has no recourse if she breaches.
Another example is a record club whose membership consists of an initial enrollment
purchase of twelve records for one cent together with the promise to pay a high price for
some number of additional records at a later date. If the club later refused to sell the
additional records (even at the high price), it is doubtful that the initial discounted sale
would be voided, or that the buyer would owe additional money.
On the other hand, suppose a buyer puts down a deposit on a couch. only to cancel her
purchase subsequently. If the deposit is unreasonably large "in light of the anticipated orCadillac Contracts and Up-FrontPayments: by A.S. Edlin Page 14
actualharm caused by the breach, thedifficultiesofproofofloss,and the inconvenience
or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining adequate remedy,"acourt may insist that some
of itbereturned under the UniformCommercialCode Section2—718.Yet,supposethe
couchwere custom-made and that the maker had to orderspecialfabricsand foamswith
lovi resale value, In consideration of this specific investment, the customer makes what
we call an up-front payment; or, perhaps she simply buys the materials from the maker,
and a separate contract is written to build the couch, so that if the buyer cancels the
construction (breaching), she should be entitled to no refund on her purchase of materials
(or payment for investment). When the buyer is seen to be purchasing the investment
in a separate deal, the up-front payment will not be refundable toa breaching buyer
unless the investment were not made. If the up-front payment were made ina separate
agreement. the penalty doctrine might not apply across the agreements.
Again, we remind the reader that the above analysis is valuable even in those cases or
jurisdictions where the breacher could sue. Then, the analysis provides a policy reason
why a breacher should not be able to sue. Allowing an up-frontpayment to stand
even when it appears punitive lends the parties considerable contractingpower. Notice.
though, that efficiency is not driven simply by allowing what in somecases is tantamount
to high stipulated damages; rather, efficiency results from the combination of these"high
damages" preventing one party from breaching, and the expectation remedygiving the
other party appropriate breach and investment incentives.
2.3. No up-front payrnints: Overinvestment
For the sake of contrast, we show below that ifup-front payments are impossible (say,
because of liquidity constraints), then theRogerson—Sliavell overinvestment problem re-
turns. As the introduction discussed, Shavell[1980Jconsidersup-Front payments but
only payments made to the non-investor. Withoutan up-front payment made to theCadillac Contractsand Up.Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 1.5
investor—seller, hewill not agreeto the lowpricethat drives Proposition 1;instead, lie
will demand a price p such that
(7)
where .iswhatever investment the seller chooses given the contract. (If the inequality
were violated, the seller would always lose money.) With such a "high' price, as we shall
see, the seller always performs and the buyer becomes the potential breacher.
In order to derive the Rogerson—Shavell overinvestment effect, we must impose addi-
tional structure on the model:
(Al) —e(S) —'(S)> 0;




Assumption(Al states that marginal investment lowers production costs by more than
it increases salvage value.'7 Assumption (A2) is self-explanatory and (A3) states thai
when S =S.,salvage is efficient with positive probability. These assumptions abo;.it.
functional form and the uniqueness of 5 were unnecessary to prove Proposition I, but
we need them here to replicate the traditional overinvestment result.
Proposition 3. Assume (Al), (A2), and (A3). Then, without an up-front payment to
the investor—seller, he overinvests. (This proposition is essentially like those of Shavell
fi980j and Rogerson [1984).)
Proof: As argued above, when up-front payments are impossible. the seller will only
agree to a price p such that p —c(S)￿a(S),when evaluated at the investment level
This assumption corresponds to assumption 3 in Rogerson [1984] except thathe wrote itas a weak
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he intends to take. Consequently if the buyer stands ready to perform, the seller also
performs and receives p —c(S). (Theseller's other alternative is to salvage, which yields
a(S)if the buyer doesn't sue, and even less if the buyer sues.) lithe buyer breaches, the
seller will sue to recover
Damage3= p — c(S) — a(S) (9)
Aftersalvaging his investment for a(s),hisnet payoff is his expectancy p —c(S),just as
whenthe buyer performs.The sellers investment problem is therefore
mgxp—c(S)—S. (10)
Toprove that the seller overinvests. compare this problem to the joint surplus maximiza-
Lionproblem(2) and
(A) observe that (A3) guaranteesthat whenS =S,salvage is efficient with positive
probability;
(B)subtractthesocial planner's objective function from the seller's and observethat
thedifference is strictly increasing in 5, because of observation (A) and assumption (Al):
and
(C) apply Milgrom and Shannon's [1994] Monotone Selection Theorem, which implies
that when comparing solutions to two (single—variable) optimization problems, if the first
problem has an objective function with higher returns to increases in the control than
the second, then maximizen for the first optimization problem (weakly) exceed those for
the second.
The above observations show that the seller's chosen investment weakly exceeds the
social optimum 5. Moreover, observations A and B together imply that the seller
strictly overinvests because his first-order necessary condition is not satisfied by 5..
(Recall that S is interior by assumption.) Intuitively, the seller isovercompensated
for his incremental investment by theexpectation damage remedy, because when tradeCadillac Contracisand Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 17
isinefficient, he receives the full cost savingsthatincremental investmentwouldyield
during production, —c'(S), instead ofthelesser "social return" from salvage, u'(S). 0
Overinvestmentresults when up-front payments to the investor are impossible and
the value of tradeto the non-investor is the source of uncertainty.However, as we
have seen, sufficiently large up-front payments to an investing seller combined with a
commensurately low subsequent price ensure efficient investment. Since the buyer has
already almost fully or even fully performed, she will not breach no matter what her value.
This leaves the decision to breach in the hands of the investor. Under an expectation
remedy, a combined breacher—investor gets the full residual surplus a post, and so has
the incentives a ante to invest to maximize this surplus. This principle applies to far
more general contexts than the Rogerson—Shavell model, as shown by the following two
sections.
3. Imperfectly Informed Courts
This brief section demonstrates that the analysis of Section 2 is essentially unchanged
when courts do not observe the true damages. What is critical is that the courts impose
an unbiased measure of damages. This point, which is made in Edlin [1993), has proved
sufficiently provocative to warrant further elaboration.
Suppose that when true damages are D,thecourt observes and imposes D, where
(11)
and c represents the court's error or misperception. Assume that the parties cannot
anticipate the direction of the courts bias (i.e., the expected value of Th is D).
Sincewe are ignoring litigation costs, if the seller breaches, the risk-neutral buyer will
still bring a case whenever the true damages Darepositive. Given the low trading priceCadillac Contracts and Up-FrontPayments: by A.S. Edlin Page 18





The risk-neutral seller breaches whenever the expected payoff from breach exceeds that
from performance. This leads to the same breach rule as when the court's decision is
predictable. Moreover, the seller's expected payoff is the same as before, so the seller
hasthesame investment incentives. Thus, the unpredictability of court outcomes does
not alter the analysis as long as the court imposes an unbiased judgement Dofdamages,
which establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Proposition .2 holds even if the court does not observe true damages, as
longas the court (observes some in formativesignal and) enforces an unbiased estimate
ofdamages.
Proposition4 partially addresses the criticisms of Schwartz 11993, 406] about the
information requirements of other mechanisms that might be used as problem-solving
defaults. Of course, courts introduce a number of biases. Principal among these is
the "certainty" requirement. Courts will not guess at damages if their information is
woefully inadequate to the task. For instance, the new business rule "prohibits recovery
of lost profits resulting from a breach of contract that has prevented the plaintiff from
establishing a proposed new business, on the ground that profits in such cases are too
speculative" (Fuller and Eisenberg [1990, p. 267]). In parallel fashion, in Freund v.
Washington Square [1974], the Court of Appeals of New York found that Freund was
entitled to only nominal damages for Washington Square's breach of a contract to publish
his book; sales were unpredictable, so only token damages could be awarded. SuchaCadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 19
result biases damages downward. Therefore this model lends support to what Fuller and
Eisenberg [1990,p.267] label a "definite trend toward abrogating" the new business
doctrine, and similarly to the flavor of the Official Comment in the Uniform Commercial
Code to Section 1—106, which states that "Compensatory damages are often at best
approximate: they have to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts
permit, but no more..." For a case in line with these trends, see ['era v. Village Plaza
(19761, where the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a $200,000 jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs who had signed a ten-year lease in order to open a "book and bottle" shop.
(The plaintiffs were unable to take possession because the defendant subsequently leased
the space to a third party.)
4. General Settings and a Broad Duty to Mitigate
The principles developed in Section 2.2 are quite general, as this section reveals. This
generality gives the expectation remedy significant advantages over specific performance
in one-sided investment problems. To realize these advantages, a broad duty to mitigate
damages is a useful supplement to an expectation remedy when the seller invests. When
the buyer invests, a divisible contract is correspondingly useful.
Consider a more general setting where the seller may supply many goods and services
to the buyer, perhaps at different times and in different quantities or qualities. Let q
represent a list of the goods and services delivered, chosen from some set Q. Let v(q, 0)
represent the value to the buyer of q in contingency 9.
(Ri) Assume Q has a maximal element with non-negative value: i.e.,
3 s.t. YO,q,v(q,O) ￿ v(,9),and, v(,9) ￿ 0. (14)
Definition 3. A Cadillac contract is a contract to trade a maximal element.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 20
Cadillacsarelarge, luxurious cars, traditionally at the top of GMs line. Accordingly,
aCadillac contractisa top-of-the-linecontract for alargerquantity ormore quality
than isgenerallyefficient to trade.Infact, we have definedan extremeform of Cadillac
contractinvolving the most valuable trade possible. If the Department of Defense orders
,5O jet fighters of extraordinary capabilities, this may be &Cadillaccontract. It will
function as one if any renegotiations will be for jets with fewer capabilities and/or for
fewer jets. Similarly, when a moving company promises to deliver all your belongings to
your new residence intact,thisis as valuable as their performance could be. (Those who
have moved will know that many times their performanèe falls a touch below this high
standard.)
A Cadillac contract generalizes an important feature of any non- random contract to
trade in a discrete trade/no-trade context. It implies that any adjustments in trade are
"downward." This feature was subtly implicit in the contracts in Section 2.
In this section, we assume the seller can buy m assets, denoted by S eR,which may
affect the cost of performing q. (Each of the ntassetsmay vary in scale or quality since
each is associated with a real number.) The assets cost I(S),whereI R' 'RLet
the cx post cost of producing q be c(S,q,9). The costs c represent the most economical
method of producing q with S given 9. In some contingencies, thismay involve selling
as salvage some of the assets embodied in S; in others, all of S may be fully used in
production. It is worthwhile keeping in mind that the function cisa reduced form,
which may capture sophisticated deployment decisions)8
Suppose the parties have written a Cadillac contract to "trad&'with the entire
an example, let A E20 m) representthe indicesof the assets putto alternative use. (A can
be any subset of {1m}.) Thenthe assets in alternative use can be represented as LEA where
is the jUt element of S ande isthe ith unit vector (01,..., 0). The valuederived fromthe assets
put to alternative use is a(EIEA Seb9) .Supposefurther that the costs of production of q using the
assets not in A i (LASej,q,9).Then, we would have
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payment T made up front, so that no payment is required whenis performed.1° Con-
sider the situation after the investment S is made and contingency U realized. What will
the seller supply? If the seller supplies q ,thebuyer can accept or reject the tender.
Regardless, the buyer will sue because by (BI), v(.9) ￿ v(q,O), so the buyer suffers
non-negative damages.2° If the buyer accepts q, her damages are
D=v(.9)—v(q,9). (15)
lithe buyer rejects q, her damages depend upon the law's view of the duty to mitigate
damages. If mitigation requires accepting partial or inferior performance1 the buyer can
recover at most v(,9) —v(q,O),which motivates the following definition.
Definition 4. Suppose a buyer has paid up front and been promised .Undera broad
duty to mitigate damages, if offered q. the buyer can collect only u(.O) —v(q,6)in
damages.
Vithouta broad duty to mitigate, the breach victim may secure more than the benefit
of her bargain by threatening to refuse q unless the seller agrees to pay larger damages.
This duty to mitigate is broader than often obtains. For instance, in Parker u. Twentieth
Century-Fox [1970J, the California Supreme Court held that Shirley MacLame Parker did
not need to accept Twentieth Century's offer to star in a western titled "Big Country,
Big Man" to mitigate damages for Twentieth Century1s breach of the contract in which
she was to star in a musical titled "Bloomer Girl." Also, in the context of the sale of
goods, under the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-601, the buyer has the right to
"reject the whole" if "the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform
'91t is possible to have some payments made at performance, but that requires a detaileddiscussion
of the importance of adivisible contract.
20Weassume that the non-conforming performance q callbeaccepted without compromising the
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to the contract.'21 Moreover, under Section 2-711 a "rightful" rejection by the buyer
leaves her with the same remedies as lithe seller had not performed at all. Nonetheless,
while a broad duty to mitigate may not presently obtain, the next proposition indicates
it would have some advantages.
Proposition 5. A Cadillaccontractto supplyfor an up-front payment T leads to
efficient investment andbreachwhen an expectation damage measure is applied andthe
buyerhas a broad duty to mitigate damages.
Proof:Joint surplus is maximized by solving the fOllowing iterativeprogram: Ex
post, given assets S, and the realized contingency 0, choose q to solve
Z(S,9) rnaxv(q,9) —c(S,q,9). (16)
Ex ante, joint surplus is maximized by choosing S to solve
mg.xEEZ(S,Ofl—I(S) (17)
where E denotes the expectation operator.
Under a Cadillac contract, with payment T made entirelyup front, the seller solves
a nearly identical problem. Suppose the seller deliversq 4. Given the broad duty
to mitigate damages, the buyer's rights will be limited to damages ofv(4, 0) —v(q,0)
regardless of whether he rejects or accepts q. Since the contract is a Cadillaccontract,
v(4, 9)— v(q, 0)0, so the buyer will, in fact, demand, and if necessary sue for, payment
of v(4, 9) —v(q,0). Therefcre, given S and 0, the seller chooses q ex post to solve
W(S,O)=rIaQx—D(q,9)_c(S,q,9) , (18)
where damages D(q,9) =v(q,9)
—v(q,9).
31/is other sectionsin the Uniform Commercial Codemake clearthese rights of rejection should not
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The seller's ex post objective function is the same as the joint surplus lessu(,O), so
the seller's optimal choices of q match those from surplus maximization. The seller'sex
ante investment problem is to solve
mgxE[W(S9)]—I(S) (19)
Since W(S,O)Z(S,O)—v(,0), the seller's cx ante choices of S similarly match those
under joint surplusmaximization,and the Cadillac contract to tradefor a payment
made entirely up front leads to full first-best efficiency. 0
Theexpectation damage remedy allows us to find a contract that leads to efficient
choice of assets; efficient use of assets, and efficient performance or breach. Compare this
with specific performance. Under a specific performance remedy, when the investment
decision is a one-dimensional decision, fixed-price contracts can be efficient. These results
require a continuous contractible variable q and a number of assumptions about how in-
vestment affects valuations (see Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994], ('hung [19911, and
Edlin and Reichelstein [19931). None of these assumptions are needed for theapproach
above. Moreover, even with those assumptions, the first-best can't beimplemented un-
der specific performance when the investment decision is multi-dimensional(Edlin [1993]
revealed, for instance, a bias toward investing in overspecialized assets instead of as-
sets with higher values in alternative uses). No such biases exist under an expectation
damage remedy with up-front payments and a Cadillac contract. Provided the parties
can arrange for one party to make all the cx ante investment expenditures and decisions
together with ex-post breach decisions, expectation damages is an ideal remedy.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. A large up-frontpayment by the
non-investing buyer to the investing seller ensures that the buyer performs the contract.
A broad duty to mitigate damages, includingaccepting non-conforming performance.
leaves the breach decision unilaterally in the hands of theinvestor. Otherwise someCadillac Contractsand Up-Front Payments:byA.S. Edlin Page 24
renegotiationwould be necessary because the buyer could refuse a non-conlormingtender;
such renegotiation would typically involve splitting the returns to investment, which
could distort investment incentives. The Cadillac contract eliminates contingencies where
overperformance is efficient. Such contingencies also require bilateral negotiations and
typically entail sharing the gains from extra performance, again distorting investment
incentives. (The seller cannot capture all the gains from performingq when u (q. 0) >
When the buyer invests, instead of the seller, the analysis proceeds similarly. For this
non•balancing' approach, we would then want the buyer to effectively dictate the level
of performance and capture the residual created beyond the seller'sexpectancy. Two
features are necessary. A Cadillac contract would ensure that the seller hasa duty to
deliver performance at least as valuable as is efficient. Second, if the buyer decides he
wants to cancel (the inefficient) part of performance, this must not discharge the seller's
remaining duty to perform the non-cancelled parts of the contract. This requires that the
court construe the contract as "divisible"—essentially as a number ofseparate smaller
contracts. Such a construction allows the buyer to cancel inefficientparts of the contract
and still have the seller deliver the efficient parts orpay compensatory damages.22 It
thereby avoids negotiation and surplus—splitting, allowing the buyer—investor tocapture
alt residual, just as the broad duty to mitigate allowed the seller-investorto capture all
residual in Proposition 5.
ln some cases where the buyer invests, a divisible contract isunnecessary. For instance, in our lease
examplethe economics department (the buyer) invests. The department hasaproperty right to stay (orthe duration of the tease; moreover, it can move out early withoutneeding any agreement from the
landlord (though it would owe damages). Thus the law allocates decisionrights over q to the lessee, (at
least when q <i), which means no divisible contract is needed.Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 25
5. Implications
The central result of this paper is that theexpectationdamage remedy need not lead to
overinvestmentinrelationship-specificassets. In fact, even in the verygeneralcontext
of Section 4. we found that all decisions were first-best. The conventional wisdom in the
law and economics literature about distortedinvestmentresulted from assumptions about
which partybreached,a fact notedbyShavell [1980] inthe simple discrete-trade context
of Section 2. Yet. even inthatsimple context,amajorpartof thepuzzlewas left out: If
up-frontpayments to the investor are possible,theparty who breachesisnot determined
exogenously by whichpartyhas uncertain valuations, as Shavell (19S0j assumed. Quite
thecontrary. when such up-frontpayments arepossible, the partiesthemselvescontrol
whowillwant to breach in low-tradecontingencies. Whenthe non-investing partymakes
a sufficiently large up-front payment,shewill wanttocarryoutthe contract even if
hervaluation provesunfavorable—any breach will bemade bythe investingparty. This
arrangement provides efficient investment and breachincentivesundertheexpectation
damage formula.
Thuswhen onepartyneeds tomake aspecific investment, it is natural thatthe other
shouldmake some payment early. An up-front payment is desirable even when neither
party will flee or become bankrupt and the legal system costlessly enforces contracts.
The payment determines who wants to breach, which is critical under an expectation
damage remedy.
From this analysis we learn a number of lessons about policy. Notice first that we
assumed that the breaching party could not successfully sue. This prevented the "race to
breach discussed in Section 2, allowing the parties to control who breached. This argues
that courts should be skeptical of unjust enrichment claims, or at least honor contracts
that give up the right to sue for unjust enrichment. Similarly, we provide another reasonCadillac Contractsand Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlin Page 26
whycourts should not invoke the penalty doctrine toreturndeposits.
Another lesson is that the courts should take a broader view of the duty to mitigate—
or at least stand ready to take a broad view ifrequested in thecontract. Such a view of
mitigation was critical to the efficiency of Cadillac contracts in Section 4. Correspond-
ingly,when the buyer istheinvestor, thecritical issue becomes the divisibilityof the
contract.
A third lesson is that specific performance is not always the bestremedywhen specific
investments are involved. Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] argued that specific performance
is superiorwhen both parties make investments (but wheie theinvestments were simplis-
tic). Vet when the investment and breach decisions can all be allocated to one party, the
expectation remedy is superior because multi-faceted investment can be efficient. There-
fore, when parties neglect to specify a remedy, as they often do, expectation damages is
a good default rule in one-sided investment problems. Its application implies that the ex
ante incentives of the contract breacher were appropriate (at least the incentives arising
from the given contingency). These first-best incentivesmay very vell be gotten at the
expense of incentives for the victim of breach (see Edlin and Reichelstein [1993]), but
this will not matter if the victim does not make substantial reliance decisions.
The victim of breach may seek specific performance, because shemay use the threat of
forcing inefficient performance to increase her total payoff. The courts, however, should
be loathe to grant it unless she can show some relianceor specific investment of her own.
This proposal might be viewed as giving a new interpretation to the rule thatspecific
performance is only granted when the "legal remedy" of damages are "inadequate." The
inadequacy of damages is traditionally viewed as meaning that damages are difficult
to measure, such as with unique chattel. Section 3,however, showed that difficulty of
measurement per se is not particularly important. The model indicates that the victim of
breach should have to show that theremedy is "inadequate" because it does not provideCadillac Contractsand Up-FrontPayments: by A.S. Edlln Page 27
partksin her position with appropriate incentives ex ante.Expectation damageswould
not provide appropriate incentives to the victim of breach (seeRogerson11984], Shavell
[1980], and Edlin and R.eicbelstein 11993J). When the breach victim also must invest,
then, specific performance isbetterasit providesmorebalanced incentives (seeEdlin
andReicheistein (1993)).
Finally, we should ponder theimplicationsof Section 3,whichexplained that the
accuracy of the expectation measure isnotso important as its unbiasedness.Thissug-
gests that it is worthwhile to consider the efficacy of certain legal rules that tend to bias
damages. One such rule is the rule thatdamages must be"certain".
Before closing, itisworth recalling some assumptionsthatwarrant examination in
future work. In particular, we have stuck to the Rogerson 11984] and Shavell [1980)
assumption that courtsarecostless. Thisallowsa better understanding oftheirwork, h,
relaxing theassumptionwould clearlybe worthwhile togain a more accurate descripi
theory. Relaxingtherisk-neutralityassumptionwould also be a valuable exercise.
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